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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Statutory corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No.
10023

vs.

REX H. COX and WILMIN A COX,
his wife,

Defendant-Appellant.

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge

McKAY AND BURTON
By Reed H. Richards
'720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

VICTOR G. SAGERS
21 Maple Street
Midvale, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BO.\UD OF EDCl'ATIOX OF
TilE ClL\XlTE SCHOOL DIS'l'HICT. a Statutory corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

HEX II. COX
his wife '

andv:~'lLl\IIN
f

A COX,
De en d ant-Appe ll ant.

I
,', Case N o.
10023

I

PETIT lOX FOR..:\ REHEARING AND BRIEF
IX SUPPORT THEREOF

The defendant and appellant, Rex H. Cox, in the
above eititled action respectfully petitions the Court
to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause for the
reason and upon the grounds that in its opinion heretofore rendered the Court erred in the following particulars:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRl\IING 1\.
MODIFICATION OF A PREVIOUSLY AI~.,
FIRMED INFERIOR COURT'S ORDER AND
HAS, IN FACT, DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING .A
MODIFICATION OF A PREVIOUSLY AFFIRMED ORDER AND HAS ILLEGALLY
DELEGATED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO AN INFERIOR TRIBUNAL.
The undersigned attorney for the Defendant and
Appellant, Rex H. Cox, herein certifies that in his
opinion there is merit to the foregoing claims and that
the court committed errors in the particulars above
specified.

VICTOR G. SAGERS
Attorney for Defendantand Appellant

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING A
MODIFICATION OF A PREVIOUSLY AF4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1· lH~IBl> l~FEUIOH.

l'OtrRT'S ORDER AND
Ii.\S. l~ F.ACT, D.EPHJVED THE APPELL.AX'f-UEFEXDANT OF HIS CONSTI'fGT1U~ ~\ L HIC~HTS.
The 1\ ppellant-Defendant 1n its original appeal
before this court, Case No. 9844, practically begged this
Court to assume jurisdiction of the original appeal
hoth frotn equity as well as a law basis. The Appellant
in that case quoted extensively of proper and applicable
applications of Rule 60 (b) in support of his position
und in order that equity and justice would prevail.
However, notwithstanding same this Court rendered its
decision strictly from a legal basis, forgetting the equities. and in effect, in said prior decision said that the
trial court had heard the arguments and said the split
decision rendered by the trial court in the previous
appeal should be affirmed.
Article I. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution says
as follows:
"X o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
The words "life, liberty, and property," are to be
taken in the broadest sense as indicative of the three
great subdivisions of all civil rights. McGrew v. Industrial Comm.J 96 U. 203, 85 P2d 608.
"Due process of law." con1es to us from the Great
Charter and is synonyn1ous with "law of the land." It
means. in effect, that a party shall have his day in court
5
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-trial. Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry.

Co.~ 6

U. 253, 21 P.

944, 4 L.R.A. 724.

Due process of law requires that notice be given
to the persons whose rights are to be affected. It hears
before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. Riggins v. Dist1·ict Cuur!
of Salt Lake County~ 89 U. 183, 217, 51 P.2d 645.
The Supreme Court in cases at law tried before a
court without a jury, shall examine the evidence only
so far as may be necessary to determine questions of
law, and it should not pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify finding or judgment, unless there
is no legitimate proof to support it and in no case,
whether tried with or without a jury, will the appellate
court determine questions of fact. Lyman v. Town of
Price~ 63 U. 90, 222 P. 599. This Court in the previous
decision in effect ignored either the liberal or narrow
construction of Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. and, as stated
above, decided the previous appeal on the legal issue
only. Yet, in this appeal the Supreme Court has said
that the court has assumed jurisdiction from both an
equity standpoint and a legal standpoint and has in
effect reopened the previous case and has reviewed this
case de novo not only on the current appeal, Case No.
10023 entire record but on the previous appeal entire
record, Case No. 9844. In Re Thompson~s Estate~ 72

U. 17, 269 P. 103.
We firmly allege that the instant appeal, Case No.
10023, has nothing whatsoever to do with the previous

6
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nppeal awl that the Court in this decision cannot, should
not, and is duly bound not to, look into the record of
the pre,·ious appeal at this titne or review the facts or
ddc:rmiue at this point whether the findings of the first
l'ase were properly detennined, or supported, or justified hv the evidence. \ Ve definitely do not agree with
the court's decision in the previous case but as indieated in our nmin brief in the instant appeal we are
duty bound to abide by it and believe likewise that this
<."ourt is now so duty bound.
Our P.R.C.P., as indicated In the main brief,
specifically sets forth the rules and procedures to be
followed in connection \vith motions to alter or amend
judgments which, of course, the plaintiff at no time
has afforded itself of such rights and has, therefore,
lost same. \Ve again invite the court's attention to the
fact that at no tin1e in (lll/f stage of the proceedings did
the plaintiff tnake any objections to the judgment of
its own making until at such time as the defendant
demanded paytnent of the judgment, which was after
this Honorable Court had affirmed the lower court's
inequitable and two-headed order setting aside the judgment as to \Y ihnina Cox and refusing to set aside same
as to this appellant and said case had been remitted to
lower court. X otwithstanding that said judgment was
originally rendered without the plaintiff submitting a
contract. therefore, making said original judgment
erroneous as to both defendants. 'Ve allege that this
appellant is being deprived of his property without due
7
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process of law inasmuch as he has not been afforded
his day in court, has been required, at great financial
loss, to attempt to obtain justice through the use of our
legal process, but has been denied same, by having a
case which was previously determined and affirmed
reopened by a court of inferior jurisdiction, thereby
overruling an already settled matter.
The majority opinion rendered its decision by stating that this court is utilizing hindsight in applying
Rule 60 (b) of our U.R.C.P. We allege that this is
indeed a poor basis of rendering a decision and counter
by stating that if our foresight was as good as our hindsight Mr. Cox would not now be before the court attempting to obtain justice as he and the other defendant
would have sought counsel prior to an illegal judgment
having been rendered against them. The majority
opinion further sets forth the rule that its opinion should
not affect any issues in the pending action against the
other defendant. This certainly appears to be extremely
ineffectual because if this Honorable Body can allow
an inferior court to overrule this court's decision by
altering an already affirmed judgment then it is inconceivable to believe that this court's decision in the instant
appeal will not be used against the defendant, Wilmina
Cox, in the determination of her rights and could rightfully be cited as a precedent.
Also, issue is taken with the granting of costs to
the plaintiff as the court has by this decision in effect
said to each and every defendant or appellant that there

8
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no busis whatsoeYer for you to win against a public
t•orporation or utility regardless us to whether or not
you are being depriYed of your property rightfully or
without due process.
j..,

POINT TWO
TIIE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING A
)lODIFICATION OF A PREVIOUSLY AFFIR~IED ORDER AND HAS ILLEGALLY
DELEGATED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTIIORITY TO AN INFERIOR TRIBUNAL.
At the risk of appearing facetious, which is certainly
not the writer's intent, we call the court's attention to
the specific jurisdiction of both the Supreme Court of
the State of lTtah and the District Courts of the State
of Ptah as follows:

Article 8, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution sets
forth the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as follows:

" ... In other cases the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction only, ... "
Article 8, Section 7, lHah Constitution describes
the jurisdiction of the District Court as follows:
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all rna tters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited
by law, ... "
The powers given these respective courts by these
prm·isions cannot be enlarged or a bridged by the legis9
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lature. State ex rel. Robinson v. D1trand~ 36 U. 93, 104

P. 760.
Although District Courts of this state are courts
of original jurisdiction, haYing jurisdiction in all matters both civil and criminal which are not excepted by
law or the Constitution, one District Court has no
power to exercise control over another. Nielson v. Schiller_, Judge, 92 U. 137, 66 P. 2d 365. Even though the
statutes provide that the Supreme Court and the District Courts have the right to promulgate certain rules
and regulations the Constitution specifically prohibits
the enlargement of the jurisdiction in the respective
courts and we definitely believe the intent of the various
Statutes of the State of Utah and the Constitution of
the State do not provide for, nor was it intended to
permit, a District Court (a court of inferior jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court) to overrule a previously affirmed
judgment by the Supreme Court of a previous District
Court's judgment. Such construction must be put upon
the powers which are conferred, and the restrictions
which are imposed upon each tribunal, as is most consonant with the general design and will be most effectual
in enforcing and carrying into effect the will of framers
of Constitution. State v. Johnson~ 100 U. 316, 114
P. 2d 1034.
It appears that this Court has perpetrated a twoheaded monster inequitable decision in the previous case
and has in effect allowed itself to be overruled by a
court of inferior jurisdiction as well as permitting one

10
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int't:t·ior cou1·t judge to change at will a previously
utt'irmcd decision of the sa~ne court, which, of course, is
improper and illegal. If this decision is per1nitted to
stund then no judgment whatsoever heretofore having
been made will be permitted to stand as a final decision
and will certainly encourage everyone to continue to
litigate and relitigate each case at will.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the arguments previously set forth
in the n1ain brief, we believe Chief Justice Henroid' s
dissenting opinion briefly sets forth the appellant's
position and which is in accordance with our Constitu·
tion and Statutes and we quote at length as follows:
" ... The judgment for $42,000 persisted in
favor of Cox without complaint or motion for
modification on the part of the plaintiff, either
before, during pendency of appeal, or for a considerable tiine after this court affirmed the judgInent and remitted the case for execution thereof.
At that time there was a valid, subsisting judgment for $42,000 in favor of Cox personally,
which could have been assig·ned by him for value.
The condemnation proceeding as yet has not been
pursued to a conclusion against Mrs. Cox.
"I am of the opinion that after remittitur by
this court affirming the judgment, it was too late
arbitrarily to cut it in half, which amounts to a
reversal by the trial court of half this court's
affirmanc~.
"The contract was to pay two joint vendors
$42,000 and either or both were entitled to collect
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11

that sum on principles of joint tenancy where
each has an undivided moiety of the whole. It
does not lie in the mouth of the grantee to assess
the relative values of joint tenant interests.
"Cutting the price in half not only puts a price
tag on Cox's interest, but i1npliedly, at least,
puts the same tag on Mrs. Cox's joint interest,
-and she was not a party to any contract. She
was not subject to specific performance at all.
She may consider her joint interest in the property to be in excess of $21,000, and her rights in
a condemnation suit are no answer. The $21,000
paid to Cox no doubt would be advanced as an
argument to show what a willing seller and a
willing buyer agreed upon with respect to identical or similar property in the area.
"Cutting the judgment in half as to Cox is not
the proper procedure. Conceivably an equity suit
would lie to require him to deliver full title to
the property, conditioned on penalty for failure
to perform ... "
The judgment of the lower court reducing the
previous judgment should be set aside and reversed
and costs should be awarded to the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
VICTOR G. SAGERS
Attorney for Defendantand Appellant
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